

Hardware Design for Cryptographers

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Acknowledgements:
Current and former PhD students
at UCLA and KU Leuven

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
Outline

- Given: cryptographic algorithm
- Request: “efficient” hardware design
- This lecture about Efficiency
- Later this week: cost of side-channel resistance

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Design Parameters


Embedded security:
Area, delay, power, energy,
physical security

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Embedded crypto everywhere




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Embedded crypto everywhere




IMEC: NERF - brain stimulant

Deep Brain stimulation
[Sources: J. Rabaey, National Institutes of Health, Neurology journal]

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Embedded Security




Old Model (simplified view):

- Attack on channel *between* communicating parties
- Encryption and cryptographic operations in *black boxes*
- Protection by strong mathematic algorithms and protocols

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Embedded Security



New Model (also simplified view):


- Attack channel *and* endpoints
- Encryption and cryptographic operations in *gray boxes*
- Protection by strong mathematic algorithms and protocols
- Protection by secure implementation

Need secure *implementations* not only algorithms


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Embedded Security

NEED BOTH



- Efficient, light-weight Implementation
 - Within power, area, timing budgets
 - Public key: 1024 bits RSA on 8 bit μ C and 100 μ W
 - Public key on a passive RFID tag
- Trustworthy implementation
 - Resistant to attacks
 - Active attacks: probing, power glitches, JTAG scan chain
 - Passive attacks: side channel attacks, including power, timing and electromagnetic leaks



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Cost definition

- Area
- Time: throughput versus latency
- Power, Energy
- Physical Security
- NRE (Non Recurring Engineering) cost

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AREA

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Area



- ASIC = Application Specific Integrated Circuit
 - Gate count
 - Unit = NAND gate = 4 transistors
- FPGA = Field Programmable Gate Area
 - Unit is LUT, flip-flops, see lecture Nele
- Embedded micro-controllers
 - Memory size = program size + data size

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One Standard cell NAND gate



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TIME



Clock frequency versus sample frequency
Throughput versus latency

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Real-time, throughput, latency

- Throughput = associated with **application**
 - Amount of data processed per time unit
 - Video: Gbits/sec, Internet: Gpackets/sec
 - **Real-time sample rate**: HW has to work as fast as application dictates
- Latency = associated with **application**
 - Delay from input to output
 - Measure of reaction speed or turn-around time
- High throughput and low latency don't go together

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Clock Frequency

Clock frequency is a property of the hardware!
 $= 1 / \text{max (longest combinatorial path)}$
 $= 1 / \text{(critical path)}$

- Extremely high throughput (Radar or fiber optics)
 - One operation (= hardware unit, e.g. adder, shifter, register)
 - for each operation (= algorithmic, e.g. addition, multiplication, delay)

⇒ clock frequency = sample frequency

- Most designs: time multiplexing

clock frequency \neq sample frequency

$\frac{\text{clock frequency}}{\text{sample frequency}} = \text{number of clock cycles available for the job}$

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Example: AES variations

- There is only one AES 128 algorithm
- There are multiple AES hardware implementation options.
- Basic operations:
 - Byte-sub: non-linear operation on every byte
 - Shift-row: Circular shifting of bytes in each row
 - Mix-column: multiplying the round data with a fixed polynomial
 - Add-key: XORing the round data and round key

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AES sequential

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AES: one cycle per round

- Sample frequency < clock frequency
- Example: clock is 200 MHz, sample rate is 10MHz, 128 bits per sample
- Requested throughput: min 1.28 Gbits/sec
- Puts HW limit: one AES in 20 clock cycles or less

Solution:
Parallel datapath, sequential execution

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AES: one cycle per round

Solution:

- One 128 bit datapath
- 11 clock cycles to finish one AES
- (plus load and store clock cycle)
- 200 MHz clock

Throughput: ??
Latency: ??

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Efficiency - adapt HW platform to application

Simple example: Key Schedule for secret key
Two options:

- On the "fly" = just in time processing
- Pre-compute and store in memory

Typical for **Hardware**
1 cycle/round

Typical for **Software**
Minimum around 10 cycles/byte + bandwidth

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AES Core

The diagram illustrates the AES Core architecture. It is divided into two main parts: 'Key scheduling datapath' and 'Byte Substitution Shift Row Mix Column Key Addition'. The key scheduling part shows an 'Input Key' being processed through a series of operations to generate a 'Round Key'. The data path part shows 'Input Data' being processed through 'Byte Substitution', 'Shift Row', 'Mix Column', and 'Key Addition' operations. The 'Key Addition' step uses an 'XOR' gate to combine the data with the 'Round Key'.

- Key schedule in parallel with data path
- 128-bit data and key
- One round implementation with minimum delay
 - One cycle per round
 - Direct implementation of Byte Substitution phase
- 11 cycles one encryption

Slide credit: Alireza Hodjat

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AES compact: one SBOX

- Goal: low area
- Exercise:
 - Clock is 200MHz
 - Min number of clockcycles?
 - Throughput ?
 - Latency?
- Overhead:
 - muxes
 - Control logic

The diagram shows a compact AES architecture. It features a '128 REGISTER' at the top, which feeds into a single '1 SBOX'. Below the SBOX are three stages: 'Shift Row', 'Mix column', and 'Key Addition'. The output of the 'Key Addition' stage is fed back into the '128 REGISTER'. The entire structure is connected to a bus labeled '8'.

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AES parallel and pipeline

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AES parallel = loop unrolling

- Unroll twice
- Now 6 CC
- **IF** same clock
- THEN
- double throughput
- latency: ?
- (overhead ignored)
- = expensive

The diagram illustrates a parallel AES architecture achieved through loop unrolling. It starts with a 'REGISTER' that feeds into two identical stages. Each stage contains '16 SBOX', 'Shift Row', 'Mix column', and 'Key Addition' blocks. The output of the second stage is fed back into the 'REGISTER'. The entire structure is connected to a bus labeled '128'.

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AES unroll & pipeline

1 clock cycle per AES
11 data samples in pipeline
200 MHz clock

Throughput: ??
Latency: ??

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AES loop enroll AND pipelined

In combination with AES key schedule

Slide credit: Alireza Hodjat

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
Non feedback modes of operation!!

- Example counter mode of operation
- Does not work with CBC or other feedback modes of operation

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POWER

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Cooling

- Cooling for the very small and the very large

Deep Brain stimulation
[Sources: J. Rabaey, National Institutes of Health, Neurology journal]

[San Francisco Chronicle online, source Google]

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Power and Energy are not the same!

- Power = $P = I \times V$ (current x voltage) (= Watt)
 - instantaneous
 - Typically checked for cooling or for peak performance
- Energy = Power x execution time (= Joule)
 - Battery content is expressed in Joules
 - Gives idea of how much Joules to get the job done


Low power processor \neq low energy solution !

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Heat and parallelism

Reduce power = reduce WASTE !!


M P



Power (Heat)

$P_{mono} = CV^2f$ (Watt)

M/4 P/4 M/4 P/4 M/4 P/4 M/4 P/4



$4 (C/4)V^2(f/4) = P_{mono}/4$

but since $f \sim V$

can be even $P_{mono}/4^3$


TREND: MULTI-CORE!!

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Throughput – Energy numbers			
AES 128bit key 128bit data	Throughput	Power	Figure of Merit (Gb/s/W)
0.18mm CMOS	3.84 Gbits/sec	350 mW	11 (1/1)
FPGA [1]	1.32 Gbit/sec	490 mW	2.7 (1/4)
Intel ISA for AES	32 Gbit/sec	95 W	0.34 (1/33)
ASM StrongARM [2]	31 Mbit/sec	240 mW	0.13 (1/85)
Asm Pentium III [3]	648 Mbits/sec	41.4 W	0.015 (1/800)
C Emb. Sparc [4]	133 Kbits/sec	120 mW	0.0011 (1/10.000)
Java [5] Emb. Sparc	450 bits/sec	120 mW	0.0000037 (1/3.000.000)

[1] Amphion CS5230 on Virtex2 + Xilinx Virtex2 Power Estimator
 [2] Dag Arne Osvik: 544 cycles AES – ECB on StrongArm SA-1110
 [3] Helger Lipmaa PIII assembly handcoded + Intel Pentium III (1.13 GHz) Datasheet
 [4] gcc, 1 mW/MHz @ 120 Mhz Sparc – assumes 0.25 μ CMOS
 [5] Java on KVM (Sun J2ME, non-JIT) on 1 mW/MHz @ 120 Mhz Sparc – assumes 0.25 μ CMOS

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Energy power conclusions


- Low power processor is NOT low energy solution
- Power is limited
 - Cooling!!
 - Implanted devices only temperature $\Delta < 1$ °C
- Energy Battery is limited
 - Pace maker battery is not rechargeable
 - One AAA battery is 1300 ... 5000 Joules
- **How much crypto in one micro Joule ?**

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DESIGN METHODS

For low power/low energy

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Cost of crypto primitives

Energy - flexibility trade-off

1. Secret Key: AES
2. Public key: ECC

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1 microJoule

- 11000 bits AES (ASIC)
- 3000 to 10K gates area = small

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Example 2: Public key - Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Push for lowest energy to fit budget of RFID

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Challenge: low power public key ...

Address at all design abstraction levels!

The pyramid diagram shows abstraction levels from hardware (MEM, MALU, REG) to software (Scalable Tracking Cloning). The hardware layer includes an 8-bit uP, MEM, MALU, and REG blocks. The software layer includes Binary field 2^{163} Elliptic curve, Projective, Montgomery ladder, and Common Z coord.

- **Protocol** : asymmetric (most work for the reader)
- **Algorithm**: Elliptic curve (163 bits) instead of RSA (min 1024 bits)
- **Field Operation**: Binary and not Prime fields: easier field operations
- **Projective** coordinate system: (X, Y, Z) instead of (x,y): no field inversions
- **Special coordinate system**: no need to store Y coordinates (Lopez-Dahab) and common Z (only one Z coordinate)
- **Minimize storage**: Only 5 registers (with mult/add/square unit) or 6 registers (with mult/add-only unit) compared to 9+ registers before.

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Computation needs

The pyramid diagram shows computation needs from basic GF(2ⁿ) operations to Schnorr. The layers are: Basic GF(2ⁿ) operations, Combination of GF(2ⁿ) operations, Point operations, Scalar multiplication, ECC, and Schnorr.

- One (simple) Schnorr protocol requires **one** elliptic curve point multiplication (compared to **two** at the reader)
- One point multiplication with Montgomery ladder requires **N** point additions & doublings (N = key length)
- With modified Lopez –Dahab common Z coordinate, one point addition and point doubling requires **7** field multiplications, **4** squarings and **3** additions
- One field multiplication requires 163/d clock cycles (d= digit size).
For digit size 4, **79000** cycles (should stay below 100K)

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Results

- Results: ECC co-processor that can compute:
 - ECC point multiplications (163 by 4)
 - Scalar modular operations (8 bit processor with redundancy)
- Schnorr (secure ID transfer, but no tracking protection): **one** PM
- More advanced protocols: up to **four** PM on tag
- 14K gates, 79K cycles
- At 500 KHz, corresponds to 30 microWatt and 158 msec
- One point multiplication = **4.8 microJoule**

The block diagram shows the ECC co-processor architecture. It includes an 8-bit Micro Controller, Bus Manager, RNG, Memory, Test Module, Elliptic Curve Point Mul. Control Logic, Register, and Modular. The Register is connected to five registers (Reg A to Reg E). The Modular block is connected to the Register and the Elliptic Curve Point Mul. Control Logic. The Elliptic Curve Point Mul. Control Logic is connected to the Register and the Modular. The Modular block is connected to the Register and the Elliptic Curve Point Mul. Control Logic. The Elliptic Curve Point Mul. Control Logic is connected to the Register and the Modular. The Modular block is connected to the Register and the Elliptic Curve Point Mul. Control Logic.

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RFID co-processor prototype

- Combination full-custom – standard cells
- HW and SW co-design
- DPA Side channel resistance

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1 microJoule

- 11000 bits AES encryption
- 500 bits SHA3 hash
- 1/5 of one point multiplication

Still to add physical security ...
(i.e. side-channel and fault attack resistant)

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
Communication & computation

Back of the envelope

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[source: G. Dolmans IMEC NL]

1 micro Joule

Transmission:

- 300 bits in BAN
- 11 bits Bluetooth
- 3 bits Zigbee

Encryption:

- 11000 bits AES
- 500 bits SHA3 hash
- 1/5 of one point multiplication





Ignores receive budget (= listening)
Ignores "overhead" of adding authentication bits, etc.

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Conclusions

- Time has many faces: real-time, throughput, latency, clock frequency, critical path, ...
- Power is not same as energy !
- Energy - flexibility trade-off = orders of magnitude !
- Communication- computation trade-off !

With thanks to Nele Mentens for presenting this!!